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National Security in the 21st Century:
How the National Security Council Can Solve the President’s Climate
Change Problem
by Arija Flowers*

T

Introduction

o adequately protect the national security interests of the
United States, the President should immediately implement domestic policies and vigorously pursue agreement
on international standards that stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 350 parts per million (“ppm”) as soon as possible, and
no later than 2050.1 The Obama Administration acknowledged
the real threat climate change poses to U.S. security in the 2009
National Intelligence Strategy (“NIS”) and 2010 National Security Strategy (“NSS”).2 However, in failing to use the authority
delegated to the Committee on Transnational Threats to implement climate change prevention policies, the Administration has
not met its obligation under the National Security Act of 1947 to
protect U.S. people, property, and interests.3
The most politically feasible and compelling argument for
addressing climate change promptly is that U.S. security depends
upon it. Threats to security emanating from climate change are
many and varied, internal and external, and are already beginning to occur.4 This article explains the science behind climate
change, then discusses the impacts that climate change will
have on people and communities, and the relationship of those
impacts to threats on U.S. security. In response to these impacts,
the article examines national security law and the Administration’s faulty understanding of its power under that law and suggests how the Administration can use the authority it already
possesses to implement the necessary policies to ensure a comprehensive national security program and actions to take to meet
the present and future threat posed by climate change.

Climate Science
There is no longer any scientifically sound question as to
whether anthropogenic climate change is occurring, and will
continue to occur in the future; only the ongoing debate of how
much change human activity will produce remains.5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report finds
definitive anthropogenic warming between 3.2°F and 9.2°F
over the twenty-first century.6 Based on the amount of carbon
already released into the atmosphere, the Earth is committed to
a temperature increase of at least 2°F.7 The best estimates of
the IPCC, which depend on future reductions in CO2 emissions,
predict global average temperature increases of 3.2°F to 7.2°F
during the twenty-first century.8
In order to understand climate science, it is important to
also understand the political environment surrounding climate
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change science and to consider what that means for determining
future policies in the United States. The IPCC is a joint project
of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization that has compiled extensive, highly scrutinized data9 to
become the source of internationally accepted science on climate change, relied on by governments around the world including the U.S. government.10
The problem with the scientific numbers presented by the
IPCC is that they are influenced by the politics of strong, fossilfuel-dependent nations like Saudi Arabia, the United States, and
China, whose economies run on the sale and use of fossil fuels.11
The desire to keep their economies humming without changing their habits is a strong incentive to downplay the impacts
of CO2.12 Middle Eastern member states, like Saudi Arabia,
work to ensure that the primary export upon which their entire
economy depends on is not rendered valueless by the findings.13
Thus, the highly certain findings of the IPCC report exist in spite
of the efforts of oil exporting countries to water-down the language until more evidence of anthropogenic change is found.14
The result is an IPCC report with watered-down, politically
motivated findings,15 being represented to the global community
as scientifically factual findings,16 and ultimately the international acceptance of compromised science as the basis for climate change policy.
Other scientists, unconstrained by the challenges within
the IPCC, believe more significant temperature—and climate—
change will occur.17 Scientists know from studying ice cores
that Earth’s surface temperature increased 9°F when CO2 levels in the atmosphere rose by 100 ppm at the end of the last
ice age.18 Thus, logic renders it unlikely that a doubling of CO2
over the level in 1800 (an increase of approximately 280 ppm,
or nearly three times larger than the prior increase) will result in
a temperature increase of just 5.4°F, as the IPCC seems to predict.19 Based on scientific data, leading experts believe that the
current global goal must be to reduce CO2 concentrations below
350 ppm in order to prevent and reverse destabilizing global
warming.20
Climate science is becoming increasingly more accurate
as scientists continue to refine computer simulation programs
called Global Circulation Models.21 With increasing frequency,
these computer programs are able to accurately model weather
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and climate events based on inputted data, for events that already
happened in the past.22 Because the events already happened and
we know what the model should look like, the computer models’
accuracy can be readily tested and proven by its ability to correctly forecast those events.23
Comparing current predictions with known previous atmospheric changes illustrates the appropriateness of skepticism
regarding the more conservative scientific estimates, like those
of the IPCC. Further, the scientifically accepted 550 ppm CO2
“threshold,” which is the maximum allowable level to avoid
inducing dangerous climate change, is nearly twice as high as
pre-Industrial Revolution levels.24 Even the IPCC predicts an
increase in temperature varying from 3.2°F to 7.2°F,25 which
is clearly below the 9°F history has proven can occur.26 Given
these illogical ratios, it is reasonable to be skeptical of the conservative estimates of the impacts of climate change, rather than
skeptical that climate change is real.

Ways in Which Climate Change Impacts
Threaten U.S. Security
Congress and the White House understand that climate
change threatens U.S. national security, because it threatens
internal systems and contributes to the destabilization of governments and people abroad.27 The range of threats begin with
“natural” disasters, including increasingly severe hurricanes like
Katrina in 2005,28 and extend to heightened terrorism risks as
diminished resources threaten livelihoods and foreign populations slip further into extremism.29
Natural disaster impacts are easier to visualize because they
have a direct cause and effect. Sea level rise threatens to wipe
small island nations off the face of the Earth.30 Rapid rising sea
levels of this type directly threaten military infrastructure on
low-lying islands, and in all coastal regions worldwide.31 More
hurricanes of higher intensity means military equipment and
personnel must be moved out of harm’s way, adding expense
and wear and tear, reducing general readiness, and interrupting
training operations.32 Increasingly severe storms can devastate
infrastructure, as hurricane Andrew damaged Homestead Air
Force Base in Florida in 1992 and prevented the base from ever
reopening.33 More frequent and intense flooding has similar
impacts, requiring disaster response, while simultaneously damaging the economy, and wasting resources that could be utilized
elsewhere. The Navy has additional concerns about vessel safety
in a polar ice-free world, since mapping of shifting ice locations
will become more difficult.34
The United States has the most varied and severe weather
of any country on Earth.35 With vast, drought-prone, high, arid
plains, extensive coasts vulnerable to sea level rise, coasts that
have already been battered by record-intensity hurricanes, and
plains repeatedly flooded by rivers following massive rains and
snow-melt runoff, the United States has more to lose in terms of
climate change induced domestic threats than nearly any other
country, except perhaps those that will be lost to the oceans.36
The western states should prepare for decreased snowpack and
correspondingly reduced summer runoff37 and extended periods
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of drought.38 Without even addressing the military components
of homeland security, these direct impacts on the infrastructure,
economy, and livelihoods of citizens threaten the security of
most of the largest cities in the U.S., because they are located
on coasts, and much of the farmland located in flood plains.39 It
is clear, however, that changing precipitation patterns, increased
severe weather events, and rising sea levels are all expected in
the future, with negative direct implications for U.S. national
security interests.40
The more complex threats are the indirect effects, which
result not from the changed climate and associated weather
events, but from the human actions which follow. As resources
become scarcer and local living conditions harsher, populations
with weak governments that are unable to assist those people in
adapting to changes will likely resort to methods of self-preservation.41 U.S. military leaders expect the United States will
see increased conflict for resources, mass migrations to escape
the dearth of resources, and incidences of terrorism.42 Where the
most basic resource needs—food and water—go unmet, disputes
spiral into full-fledged conflict,43 as evidenced by the “at least
[eleven] violent conflicts since 1990 [which] have been fueled
in part by the degradation of renewable natural resources.”44 In
these situations, populations may turn to extremism and terrorism,45 similar to al-Qaida in Afghanistan where half the country’s gross domestic product comes from farming or ranching,
but drought and overuse of the land has left most of the country
at risk of desertification.46 Populations will also likely participate
in mass migrations as environmental refugees increase global
tensions and further strain resources in the new location.47 The
IPCC and others believe that average global warming exceeding
3.6°F may be dangerous,48 while others argue that 3.6°F “warming would be catastrophic for large segments of humanity.”49
This type of instability in the developing world is a “threat
multiplier”50 and U.S. military leaders believe that “climate
change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on
terror”51 because “droughts, violent weather, ruined agricultural
lands—those are the kinds of stresses we’ll see more of under climate change [which lead directly to] more poverty, more forced
migrations, higher unemployment” so that “climate change prolongs those conditions [that increase terrorism risks] . . . [and]
makes them worse.”52 Many nations that struggle to maintain
political stability currently, or are likely terrorist safe-havens, are
also highly vulnerable to destabilizing climate change impacts,
such as drought,53 flooding,54 and increased disease.55 When a
region is “traumatized by an event or a change in conditions triggered by climate change . . . [i]f the government there is not able
to cope with the effects . . . you can be faced with a collapsing
state . . . as breeding grounds for instability, for insurgencies, for
warlords.”56 Ultimately, these conditions enhance the threat of
terrorist networks and risks for U.S. security.57
Increased temperatures will have dire consequences for
fresh water access, flood mitigation, and human health.58 Access
to fresh water for drinking, farming, and hygiene is threatened
by changing precipitation patterns and especially by altered
mountain glacier runoff.59 Three billion people already live in
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water-stressed developing nations. However, that number is
expected to increase to half of the global population by 2030 and
those people will be exposed to high water stress, beyond what
is currently experienced.60 In addition to the increased spread
of disease resulting from reduced water availability,61 human
exposure to malaria will double and dengue fever will increase
with only a 1°F to 2°F temperature rise as the geographical
range of mosquitoes expands to new regions.62 Drought—or
permanently drier climates—result in food and water shortages,
as seen in Darfur, Sudan, that pose serious threats to stability,63
and these conditions are expected to increase around the globe.64
What began in Darfur as a struggle between farmers and camel
herders for minimal water during time of “drought” became a
permanent end of precipitation in the region, leading to desperation, civil unrest, and mass migrations.65 Mass migrations out of
permanently “drought” afflicted areas into northern hemisphere
countries should be anticipated, along with strained resources
and tempers in all regions.66
Changes in sea level and acidity could also have a devastating impact on communities around the world.67 Approximately
two-thirds of the world population lives within fifty miles of
the coast, and in some places, including New Orleans and The
Netherlands, below sea-level.68 Many vulnerable populations
live within the expected zone of sea-level rise, including the
ten million inhabitants living within three feet of sea-level in
Bangladesh.69 In addition to the encroaching waters, many of
the vulnerable populations are also vulnerable to the increasing
acidity of the oceans, which is a primary source for protein for
more than one billion people.70 Ocean acidity is increasing at a
rate that will be evolutionarily difficult for fish to keep up with,
and diminished food supplies are expected to result in greater
unrest.71
Between increased crises within the United States, reduced
capacity to respond to those crises, and the possibility of
increased extremism abroad, climate change impacts directly
and indirectly threaten U.S. national security. If the President
truly believes that “[t]o advance our common security, we must
address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster
instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately
undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within
their borders,”72 then the United States must address climate
change as a leading future cause of those political and economic
de-stabilizers.

The Development and Role of
National Security Law
The Obama Administration fully acknowledges that prompt
and sweeping action is needed to bring greenhouse gases
(“GHG”) to a safe level, thereby reducing the effects and degree
of climate change.73 The 2010 NSS acknowledges that the “danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe” and that
the effects of climate change “will lead to new conflicts over
refugees and resources” as well as “catastrophic natural disasters.”74 However, the Administration incorrectly believes that
comprehensive legislation from Congress is required before
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such climate protection actions can be taken.75 The Administration already has the authority to take decisive action under the
National Security Act.
The National Security Act of 1947 (“NSA”) established the
National Security Council (“NSC”) with the intention of ensuring an open and effective working “relationship between those
responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for military
policy”76 by creating a central advisory coordinating office for
all matters related to national security.77 Before World War II,
it had become increasingly clear that the United States needed
a more unified approach to deal with national security issues,
and that need became apparent to the public at large with the
attack on Pearl Harbor.78 The NSC may have originally been
conceived of as an advisory group, rather than a force for implementation, but the group’s function has varied to both ends of
that spectrum over the years.79
The sweeping language in the opening lines of the National
Security Act of 1947 expresses Congress’s acknowledgement
of the need for a large-scale program to address threats to U.S.
security.80 The Act opens with the declaration that, “[i]n enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States;
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.”81 The Act does not
define a threat to national security, instead leaving that undefined for future experts to determine in order to fulfill the stated
purpose of the Act.82
Congress also provided for a National Security Council
whose purpose was advising the President regarding “the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security,” 83 and
other duties in addition to functions directed by the President.84
Congress’s plain intention was government-wide policies promoting national security. Though some members of Congress
expressed concern that the NSA should not delegate unsupervised authority to the Executive,85 they were persuaded that
extensive delegation would not deprive Congress the authority of oversight or implementation of new laws,86 and gave the
Executive the power necessary to carry out the desired mission:
protecting national security.87 Additionally, at the time of enactment, like today, flexibility in national security was a serious
concern and other members of Congress believed too many
restrictions on military activity would undermine the purpose of
unifying defense intelligence and strategy under this new protocol.88 Ultimately, Congress was convinced of the necessity
of the NSC as an advisory council to the President and coordination center for all matters relating to national security.89 The
result of these competing Congressional concerns was a broadly
written statute creating the NSC, which has enabled Presidents
to determine the structure and workings of the Council, while
conforming to the purpose, functions, and duties established in
the original Act of 1947.90
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Given the flexibility of the NSA, Presidents have altered
the structure and use of the NSC from its beginnings to fit their
leadership styles and the changing nature of the challenges faced
by the nation at any particular time.91 Where President Truman
rejected the authority to promote “implementation,” President
Eisenhower specifically authorized the coordinated implementation of national security policies under the NCS, creating an
Operations Coordinating Board.92 While this “implementation” function was criticized by some, its legal validity was not
questioned,93 and President Kennedy went on to invoke similar
powers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even after rejecting the
practice.94
The oscillating nature of the NSC95 peaked during President
Reagan’s tenure, in the form of the Iran-Contra Affair, but ultimately resulted in a strong and stable NSC to shape and monitor
the implementation of national security policy.96 Accordingly,
extensive reforms were made whereby the NSC became responsible for making policy recommendations and “reviewing, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of national security
policy.”97 Upon assuming office, President George H. W. Bush
was able to use his experience as the lead intelligence officer to
the NSC as a prior Director of National Intelligence to establish working groups (Policy Coordinating Committees “PCCs”)
for the NSC that actually worked.98 This structure was also
adopted by Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush because of
its effectiveness.99
Congressional approval of increased authority to the Executive was evident following the attacks on September 11, 2001 in
the United States, in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,100 and in President Bush’s creation of a Homeland
Security Council (“HSC”) with extensive powers.101 The President created the HSC to assist in developing and implementing
homeland security policy, and created the Policy Coordinating Committees—modeled after the NSCs PCCs that became
so effective under the first President Bush—to coordinate the
development and implementation of homeland security policies,
including working with local governments.102 Congress passed
legislation supporting this Executive-created expanded authority (the HSC’s creation), and authorized the Council to advise
the President and “perform such other functions as the President
may direct,”103 supporting a similar attitude towards the NSC,
which also contains language authorizing “other functions as
the President may direct.”104 Even before September 11, 2001,
Congressional appreciation for the need of unified, flexible, and
responsive national security systems, following increasing international terror attacks,105 was plainly expressed in the passage
of the Intelligence Renewal Act of 1996.106
Specifically, Congress added the Committee on Transnational Threats (“CTT”) to the NSC107 as part of a commitment to
reexamine and modernize intelligence and security programs108
following attacks on U.S. soil in the 1990s.109 The statute
defines a “transnational threat” as “any transnational activity
(including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the
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national security of the United States”110 or “any individual or
group that engages in an activity referred to in [the prior definition].”111 The CTT is directed to “coordinate and direct the
activities of the United States government relating to combating transnational threats.”112 The Committee is required to identify these threats; develop strategies to respond to such threats;
“monitor implementation” of those strategies; make recommendations of appropriate responses to specific transnational threats;
develop policies and “procedures” to ensure effective information sharing about such threats between Federal departments and
agencies; and develop guidelines to enhance and improve the
coordination of activities regarding national security.113
The Committee membership includes the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and any other members that the President chooses to
include.114 The NSC membership has fluctuated remarkably
since its inception,115 but Congress clearly granted the President
authority to include any one else he believes is properly included
for the purpose of protecting national security from transnational
threats.
Congress understood when passing the Intelligence Renewal
and Reform Act of 1996 that with the close of the Cold War,
non-traditional factors, from increasingly varied sources,116
influenced national security.117 Before passage of the law, floor
speeches from members of both houses of Congress advocated
for an adaptable118 and “dynamic” twenty-first century security force119 to counter the “rapidly changing threats.”120 This
included environmental research desired by the departments to
increase “understanding of global environmental challenges.”121
The language in the Conference Report indicates that Congress
supports CTT engagement in both developing and implementing coordinated policies across departments to protect the nation
from transnational threats, whatever they may be.122
Climate change is a transnational threat to U.S. national
security by the plain language of the law. First, it inherently
extends beyond the national borders of the United States
because it occurs across the planet through the atmosphere and
oceans.123 Second, the negative impacts of climate change, documented above, both from a purely domestic perspective and
from added tensions and risks at the global scale, establish the
consequences of climate change as national security threats.124
The original intention of Congress to create a unified security
force capable of adapting to the emerging and unknown threats
that left the United States vulnerable prior to World War II supports these broad and evolving views of national security.125
Even President George W. Bush’s policies support the inclusion of climate change by including “manmade disasters” in the
realm of national security.126 Thus climate change plainly falls
within the delegated responsibility of the NSA’s Committee on
Transnational Threats.
Congress has specifically recognized the importance of
climate change in the context of national defense127 and, since
2008, has required the Department of Defense to include the
armed forces capability to handle “the consequences of climate
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

change” in its Quadrennial Defense Review.128 At the same
time, Congress required all future National Security Strategy129
and National Defense Strategy reports to provide military personnel guidance on how to “assess the risks of projected climate
change.”130
Excuses that responsibility for implementing policies to
protect against climate change are already within the authority
of other departments and agencies within the Executive, and thus
outside the President’s authority within the NSC, are unfounded.
This argument rests on CO2 regulation by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), which currently only has authority
to regulate GHG emissions131 to protect the public health or welfare.132 EPA does not have authority to implement GHG policies
to protect national security.133 The President and his NSC have
a mandate to do so,134 and climate change policy is not solely
about air quality standards, but also about protecting Americans
from increasing threats posed by catastrophic weather events,
destabilized global populations, and terrorism.
The variation in Presidential styles and uses of the NSC over
the years, recently expanded powers granted to the Presidency,
and creation of the CTT all demonstrate the President’s power to
use the NSC to establish policies and to oversee their implementation in the other departments. President Obama ought to use
his NSC to implement policies protecting the U.S. from modern
threats,135 since the purpose of the Act was to provide the United
States with a “comprehensive program . . . of integrated policies
and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of
the government relating to the national security.”136 Congress
has recognized climate change as a national security issue137 and
it is now the President’s responsibility to use the NSC and the
CTT to their fullest capacity, as Congress intended, to protect
U.S. security.

Recommendations
U.S. national security policies cannot be based on internationally accepted science, when that science is subject to
manipulation by segments of the U.S. public and private sectors, as well as some of the very nations whose activities may
threaten U.S. national security.138 To adequately address climate
change in the national security context, the United States ought
to abandon its reliance on the conservative IPCC estimates and
use the best available science to determine the actual risks, and
likelihood of those risks, to people, property, and interests of
the United States.139 Recent studies, including those by NASA
scientists, make clear that change must occur promptly to adequately reduce CO2 levels.140
The United States should also take on the challenge like a
new Cold War, fully deploying all resources necessary to defeat
the threat. President Obama already recognized this in his 2010
National Security Strategy stating,
[w]hen the world was confronted by fascism, America
prepared itself to win a war and to shape the peace
that followed. When the United States encountered an
ideological, economic, and military threat from communism, we shaped our practices and institutions at
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home—and policies abroad—to meet this challenge.
Now, we must once again position the United States
to champion mutual interests among nations and
peoples.141
Fully engaging to defeat the threats of climate change will
require more than just tax incentives—though these should be
utilized too—it will require significant financial investment in
overhauling U.S. infrastructure and international diplomatic
maneuvering to effect the necessary changes.142
First, the President should implement an aggressive green
Job Corps program, in the style of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration, employing Americans
and building U.S. infrastructure for the new technological age,
harnessing the power of proven renewable energy resources.143
While such a program would cost significant sums of money, it
would also provide jobs to millions of Americans144 who currently receive ongoing unemployment benefits, without any benefit to U.S. infrastructure, as the job market refuses to improve
significantly.145 These jobs would vary in skill level from senior
planning positions to low-skill labor jobs building and installing
the new electrical generation and transmission systems. Additionally, proven economic advantages exist in moving to a lowcarbon economy.146 Similar to the construction of the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways under President
Eisenhower, this new infrastructure system is necessary for
U.S. security in the future.147 Not only are U.S. civilians reliant on the current fossil-fuel-burning energy grid, exposing cities and entire regions to potential brown-outs,148 so too is the
U.S. military which relies almost entirely on the national power
grid at fixed installations and on petroleum in combat and operations.149 Thus, strategic security motivations exist for moving
to renewable energies that actually improve battlefield readiness.150 Dependence on fuel supply lines reduces operational
preparedness, and results in astronomical monetary costs associated with transporting large quantities of fuel in comparison
to the dependable renewable energy options, while jeopardizing
troops’ lives.151
Second, working with the Secretary of State, the President
must actively convince other nations, like China, to do the same,
to secure U.S. security into the future.152 This could be accomplished in a similar fashion to the “space race,”153 but intentionally created, since countries that implement the new technologies
first will be better prepared for the future.154 Unfortunately, the
2010 NSS claim that the United States is “promoting universal
values abroad by living them at home,”155 is simply not true.156
The 2010 NSS claims that the United States must be a global
leader and “reengage the world” to facilitate “global cooperation
on issues . . . [including] climate change . . . that challenge all
nations, but that no one nation alone can meet.”157 These statements, while true, effectively punt U.S. responsibility in dealing
with climate change by: emphasizing the global nature of the
problem and the need for individual nations to take responsibility; professing U.S. leadership on climate change solutions while
also asserting that the U.S. will meet climate goals; but hedging
the promise with the need for Congressional action.158 Now is
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not the time for the United States to shy away, but the time to
lead by example and convince others to join our efforts, through
diplomacy and fear of future ostracism in the global community
for failure to adopt clean renewable energy technology.

Conclusion
The impacts of climate change touch every aspect of U.S.
national security. They increase destabilization of governments
and demands on U.S. resources to aid or re-stabilize a region
after a crisis. They threaten U.S. land, people, and infrastructure
around the world, and are largely preventable. However, they
are only preventable if the Administration takes responsibility
for our future and utilizes the resources available to it, indeed

required of it, to protect the national security of the United
States. The President should seek Senate approval to appoint
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Labor, as well as the
EPA Administrator, to the NSC.159 The President should rely
on the best science available, not the lowest common denominator, and should take responsibility on the international stage
for U.S. CO2 emissions by making the United States the leader
in climate change mitigation technology, enabling effective diplomatic and economic pressure in convincing other nations to
do the same. The President has the authority, and the responsibility, to establish these policies and procedures to protect U.S.
national security.
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narios, along with average expected associated temperature increase and sea
level rise for the years 2090-2099 compared against averages from 1980-1999,
and noting that actual change will depend on what policies are adopted to deal
with CO2 and that the IPCC anticipates an increase in GHG of at least twentyfive percent by 2030 over 2000 levels).
9 Organization, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter
IPCC], http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (explaining the
make-up, workings, and politics of the IPCC) (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). See
also Flannery, supra note 1, at 245 (explaining that the Assessment Report is
the result of thousands of scientists’ contributions, 426 climate experts, whose
work was twice reviewed by 440 other experts with thirty-three editors and a
final adoption by delegates from one hundred nations, and that any nation that
wants to participate is allowed to do so).
10 See 10 U.S.C.S. § 118(g) (2010) (mandating that beginning in 2009 the
President’s National Security Strategy report and the Department of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review use IPCC data in determining U.S. military capabilities to deal with climate change, including extreme weather events and to
use other “consensus climate projections” if available); Bernstein et al., supra
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11 Bernstein et al., supra note 4; Flannery, supra note 1, at 245-46.
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13 Flannery, supra note 1, at 245-46 (citing the Saudi Arabian delegate’s
claimed reason for seeking changes in wording in the Panel’s reports was a desire
to avoid repercussions to oil sales until even stronger evidence existed precisely
because oil is ninety-six percent of Saudi Arabia’s total exports, and noting that
these countries likely realize it is better for them to have a seat at the table to
influence the final language of the IPCC report, thereby protecting their economic
survival by avoiding the abandonment of fossil fuels, for as long as possible).
14 See id. (advocating for reliance on alternative scientific resources, like the
Hadley Centre and other such non-political, science-based organizations).
15 Id. at 246.
16 IPCC, supra note 9 (describing itself as a “scientific body” working to provide “rigorous and balanced scientific information” and a “clear scientific view”
on climate change and potential consequences).
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See generally Hansen et al., supra note 1; Flannery, supra note 1.
Flannery, supra note 1, at 161.
19 See id. (questioning the IPCC findings and explaining the likelihood that
modeling data is underestimating the actual impacts of climate change, possibly
from a lack of understanding about feedback loops).
20 See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 13, 16 (promoting the aggressive
pursuance of 350 ppm CO2 targets in order to avoid irreversible dynamic alterations to climate based on observations of paleoclimate data).
21 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 155 (explaining that ten GCMs currently
exist in the world, where researchers create global climate modeling systems
based on massive data inputs to create computer programs that accurately recre18
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ate previous, i.e. known, weather events and climate changes, thereby proving
the accuracy of the modeling program to accurately predict future climate
changes, and that the leading one is the Hadley Centre in England).
22 Id. at 155-56.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 28-29.
25 Bernstein et al., supra note 4, at 45 (providing data from IPCC Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios 2000 with projections varying between 1.8°C and 4.0°C).
26 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 161 (explaining that CO levels at the end of
2
the last ice age increased by only one hundred ppm yet resulted in 9°F increase
in average global surface temperatures).
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110 Pub. L.
181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008) (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 118(g)(2)) (specifying
that national security issues include impacts of climate change, specifically
mentioning severe weather events impacting both U.S. domestic and foreign
responses abroad).
28 See 10 U.S.C.S. § 118(g)(2) (expressing Congressional belief that increased
storm frequency and severity is occurring, straining military capabilities, and
threatening military infrastructure); Bernstein et al., supra note 4, at 13 (projecting a likely increased intense tropical cycles); CNA Corp., National Security and the Threat of Climate Change 6, 32-34 (2007), http://www.cna.org/
sites/default/files/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20
Climate%20Change.pdf (finding of retired military commanders that the science supports increased tropical storm severity and frequency, which adversely
impacts maintenance and stability of ships and fleets).
29 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 124-27 (arguing that conflict is not about
geographic location in the world or conflicting religious beliefs, but stems from
an instinct for survival, which is threatened when resources are scarce, thus
leading to increased violence against any perceived threat).
30 E.g., David Titley, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Presentation at the
American Meteorological Society Climate Briefing Series: Climate Change &
National Security (June 4, 2010), http://www.ametsoc.org/atmospolicy/climatebriefing/titley.html (explaining real anticipated challenges to Naval operations
in the next century in adapting to climate change, and advocating for efforts
to mitigate changes, including a commitment by the Secretary of the Navy to
reduce the Navy’s carbon footprint by twenty percent by 2020 from 2008 levels).
31 E.g., id. (noting the impact on security issues from displaced persons when
land ceases to exist where it previously did); CNA Corp., supra note 28, at
32-34 (explaining that the United States has a major logistics hub located on
an atoll in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, which has maximum elevation of
only four feet above sea level); Bernstein et al., supra note 4, at 12 (projecting
increased inundation of island communities that will threaten infrastructure and
reduce access to fresh water sources on small islands).
32 CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 35 (relating a story from retired U.S. Army
General Paul J. Kern about personnel missing a NATO training activity, with
months of planning invested, because personnel and equipment had to be relocated around the country when hurricane Hugo hit the Fort Stewart, Georgia,
where the mission was scheduled to depart from).
33 See id. at 37 (referencing also Hurricane Ivan in 2004, which removed Naval
Air Station Pensacola from service for nearly a year while repairs were made).
34 Titley, supra note 30 (explaining concerns that accompany the Navy’s
forecast that the arctic will be ice-free for approximately four to six weeks each
year by the mid to late 2030s).
35 Flannery, supra note 1, at 140 (citing Frederick K. Lutgens & Edward J.
Tarbuck, The Atmosphere: An Introduction to Meteorology (Pearson Prentice Hall 2004)).
36 Id. at 140.
37 See, e.g., Bernstein et al., supra note 4, at 11 (projecting regionalized
impacts of climate change).
38 Flannery, supra note 1, at 131 (referencing the ongoing drought of the U.S.
West, which in 2004 was in its fifth year of drought, and drawing parallels to
Darfur, Sudan, noting that such severe hot and dry conditions had not been seen
in the region in 700 years).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 16-18 (explaining the security consequences of the destabilizing effects of climate change).
42 Id.
43 Id. (pointing to the examples of the Rwandan genocide resulting from insufficient agricultural resources and ongoing situation in Darfur, which began as a
conflict between farmers and ranchers over scarce food and water supplies).
44 Christine Parthemore & Will Rogers, Sustaining Security: How Natural
Resources Influence National Security 9 (2010), http://www.cnas.org/files/
documents/publications/CNAS_Sustaining%20Security_Parthemore%20Rogers.pdf (referring to findings of the United Nations for the number and cause of
such conflicts).
45 E.g., CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 16 (mentioning both Hezbollah in Lebanon and the gang First Capital Command in Brazil as examples of how extragovernmental extremists fill the power vacuum when large populations are left
without the basic benefits of government).
46 Parthemore & Rogers, supra note 44, at 5.
47 Liliana Hisas, The Food Gap: The Impacts of Climate Change on Global
Food Production: A 2020 Perspective, at iii, 6, 12-35 (2011), http://www.
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eenews.net/assets/2011/01/19/document_cw_02.pdf (explaining the likelihood,
based on the IPCC’s own data and projections, that Earth will experience a
2.4°F increase in temperature by 2020 based on current business-as-usual patterns, likely resulting in global food shortages); Accord CNA Corp., supra note
28, at 16 (commenting that forty percent of the world population will live in a
country experiencing significant water shortages by the year 2025).
48 Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 13 (citing Susan Solomon et al., IPCC
Climate Change 2007, 996 (2007) and Michael D. Mastrandrea & Stephen
H. Schneider, Probabilistic Integrated Assessment of “Dangerous” Climate
Change, 304 Sci. 571-75 (2004)).
49 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 161 (urging climate change action by the
United States, during the Bush Administration, despite claims of concern about
“uncertainty” in the science, on the grounds that massive scientific advances
over thirty years of climate research have not dramatically reduced uncertainty,
since humanity cannot absolutely predict the future).
50 E.g., Jeffrey Mazo, Research Fellow for Envtl. Sec. & Sci. Policy, Int’l
Inst. for Strategic Studies, Presentation at the American Meteorological Society
Climate Briefing Series: Climate Change & National Security (June 4, 2010)
(explaining that many countries where climate change will likely have an
adverse impact on global terrorism are already vulnerable or failing states, so
future failure will not be a surprise, but will multiply the threat faced; however,
new threats from states that are not currently in danger of collapse, like North
Korea, Indonesia, and Columbia, could be pushed that direction by severe water
and food scarcity; hence multiplying threats that currently exist).
51 E.g., CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 17 (quoting Retired U.S. Navy Admiral
T. Joseph Lopez, Former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
and of Allied Forces in Southern Europe).
52 E.g., id. (quoting Retired Navy Admiral Joseph Lopez, explaining why climate
change promotes terrorism risks and threatens U.S. national security into the future).
53 E.g., Parthemore & Rogers, supra note 44, at 19 (highlighting the importance of Yemen’s precariously increasing risk of drought because destabilization or a failed state in the Arab peninsula region would threaten regional trade
routes and global security).
54 See Flannery, supra note 1, at 143 (noting the extreme flooding risk to Bangladesh).
55 See CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 13 (explaining that even governments
which appear stable may be unable to deal with climate change stresses and that
ineffective government breeds extremism); see also Flannery, supra note 1,
at 177, 288 (attributing the dense human population distributions in mountain
valleys in tropical climates like Mexico City and Papua New Guinea, and not
in the valleys below, to the occurrence of malaria in the massive forests below);
Parthemore & Rogers, supra note 44, at 17-19 (supporting the proposition that
these factors are connected).
56 CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 31 (quoting Retired Marine Corps General
Anthony C. Zinni, the former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command,
explaining the high price the United States will pay in the future—in human
lives and U.S. dollars lost in the war on terror—if we do not instead choose
now to spend our dollars to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 165 (highlighting challenges humanity will face with only a global surface temperature rise of 3.6°F which would
result in an 8.1°F increase for Europe, Asia, and the Americas).
59 E.g., CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 13 (asserting that even a modest rise in
temperature of only 2° to 4°F can result in increased flooding with less snow
and ice available for much needed runoff water in the dry summer months).
60 Parthemore & Rogers, supra note 44, at 17 (citing Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 (2008) and World
Water Assessment Programme, Water in a Changing World, United Nations
World Water Development Report No. 3 (2009), http://www.unesco.org/
water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/pdf/WWDR3_Water_in_a_Changing_World.pdf.
61 E.g., CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 15 (explaining that good health and
access to fresh water are necessarily linked).
62 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 177, 288 (raising concerns about what
will happen to populations that are currently not exposed to malaria and have
no immunity to the disease once a rapid exposure to the disease begins; CNA
Corp., supra note 28, at 15 (finding an increase in disease and reduced overall
health will result from temperature increases and other climate change impacts,
as identified by the World Health Organization).
63 E.g., Flannery, supra note 1, at 124-27 (explaining that a “drought” is a
temporary and transient lack of precipitation, but what is beginning to occur in
regions around the planet is actually a new, drier, Saharan-like climate where
there is no expectation that rain will return).
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E.g., Bernstein et al., supra note 4, at 13 (projecting a likely increase the
amount of area affected by drought, creating more widespread water stress,
increased risk of food and water shortages and of water- and food-borne diseases, reduced ability to produce hydropower, and exacerbating the potential
for large-scale population migrations).
65 Flannery, supra note 1, at 124-27; CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 20.
66 E.g., CNA Corp., supra note 28, at 22 (explaining the geopolitical landscape
of the future will be one of scarcity, exacerbating migrations to Europe and
within Africa, which already increases tensions and adds to national security
concerns).
67 Flannery, supra note 1, at 143.
68 See id. (explaining the planned construction of a “super dyke” in The Netherlands to protect the country from the rising oceans).
69 Id.
70 E.g., Titley, supra note 30 (asking “what will happen” to these hungry and
displaced populations living under weak governmental regimes, and positing
that military leaders believe such scenarios present increasing threats to U.S.
security due to increased demands on humanitarian aid missions in addition to
increased incidence of terrorism and extremism resulting from desperation).
71 Id.
72 The White House, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing how the United States can
best go about advancing its own national interests).
73 See id. at 47 (calling for increased fuel efficiency standards and investment
in renewable energy technologies with the goal of cutting U.S. emissions by
seventeen percent by 2020 and more than eighty percent by 2050 as the (no
doubt inadequate) solution).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 E.g., Cody M. Brown, The National Security Council: A Legal History
of the President’s Most Powerful Advisers, at ii (2008), http://www.pnsr.org/
data/images/the%20national%20security%20council.pdf (citing Unification of
the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Committee on Naval Affairs 47, 7 (1945)).
77 Id. at 1-6.
78 See, e.g., Douglas T. Stuart, Foreword to Brown, supra note 76 (relating
how Americans responded to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by desiring
a new, high-level mechanism for coordination and implementation of policies
that would effectively protect the United States from threats).
79 See Brown, supra note 76.
80 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 § 2 (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)).
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 See generally id. (providing no guidance as to what qualifies as national
security issues, only requiring that strong unified efforts must be made to protect national security and a unified defense).
83 See National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006) (emphasis added) (creating the National Security Council and establishing the broad purpose of the
council to promote policies and activities increasing national security across all
parts of the federal government).
84 See 50 U.S.C. § 402(b) (indicating the President was authorized to task the
Council with other duties to advise and monitor the implementation of the policies created to protect the national security).
85 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 76, at 2-3 (explaining the sentiment of the
Committee on Naval Affairs that the NSC must fill a policy advisory role lest it
usurp the authority of the executive in holding power to direct foreign affairs in
the name of national security).
86 E.g., id. at 39 (noting the authority Congress can assert when it believes the
Executive is exceeding appropriate authority, as happened with the War Powers
Resolution).
87 Id.
88 See 93 Cong. Rec. 9895 (July 21, 1947) (statement of Sen. Lodge) (expressing fear of an immobile and inflexible security program incapable of meeting
the needs of a future war due to provisions insisted upon by the House that
seemingly codified what general types of warfare tactics each service could
engage in; arguing that Congress should not presume any ability to foresee the
future by cementing such decisions in statute).
89 See Brown, supra note 76, at 3-4 (citing an exchange on the Senate floor
between Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Ray Baldwin expressing that the
purpose of the NSC would not be as an administrative agency, but solely as an
advisory committee, found at 93 Cong. Rec. 8497 (July 9, 1947)).
90 See id. at 10, 81 (quoting Robert Cutler, the U.S.’s first National Security
Advisor, that under the flexible framework in the NSA, “each President may
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avail himself of the mechanism in whatever way he finds best suited to his
needs” and arguing that the NSC’s development was not the result of Congress
but of powerful Executive actions necessarily resulting from the complicated
task of coordinating and effectively implementing national security policies).
91 See id. at 11, 13, 17 (elucidating the policies and practices of each President
in using and transforming the NSC since its inception, explaining the different approaches taken specifically by President’s Truman and Eisenhower, and
referring to President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Message to Congress (Apr. 3,
1958) (advocating for unifying changes so that in any future war the United
States would fight “in all elements, with all services, as one single concerted
effort” and advancing his belief that “peacetime preparatory and organizational
activity must conform to this fact”) and Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949,
63 Stat. 1067 (eff. Aug. 20, 1949), which moved the NSC into the Executive
Office of the President, and indicating that efforts by members of the NCS to
establish themselves as implementers of policy was rejected by Truman).
92 See Exec. Order No. 10483, 18 Fed. Reg. 5379, Establishing the Operations
Coordinating Board (Eisenhower, Sept. 2, 1953) (later amended by E.O. 10598;
superseded by E.O. 10700; revoked by E.O. 10920 (Feb. 18, 1961)).
93 See Brown, supra note 76, at 24-26 (referencing Senator Jackson’s recommendation as Chairman of the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery that a President use the NSC as an inner circle
for policy and strategy debate rather than as a policy development bureaucracy
and subsequent implementation bureaucracy following Presidential adoption of
a policy).
94 E.g., id. at 27-29 (citing NSAM-196, Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Kennedy, Oct. 22, 1962) which
included all members of the NSC, specifically to ensure “effective conduct of
the operations . . . in the current crisis”).
95 E.g., id. at 7, 39 (explaining how Congress’s discomfort was evidenced by
its assertion of authority in the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87
Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.), which was passed in the
aftermath of President Nixon’s fall from grace and stretched to the very limits
its Constitutional power in limiting the authority of the Executive, and the 1974
Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88
Stat. 1795 (1974)); Christopher C. Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling
the Council 18 (1991) (claiming that the NSC rebounded in the mid-1970s
as it became clear that “only the White House could effect the coordination
demanded by the mounting completing of the international system”).
96 Brown, supra note 76, at 47-59 (explaining the changes Reagan made to the
NSC during his tenure and the facts surrounding the Iran-Contra affair, leading
to Congressional oversight hearings and the reworking of the NSC structures
and authority).
97 See id. at 55 (describing how the NSC became involved in implementing
foreign policy through the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for hostages and
the funneling of excess funds earned from the arms sales to Nicaraguan rebels,
exceeding the scope of the authority to “advise” the President on national security policy and explaining the streamlined, smaller NSC organization with the
“Senior Review Group” and the “Policy Review Group”).
98 Id. at 57-58 (explaining how the “Principles Committee” (“PC”), was made
up of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Advisor,
Chairman of the JCS, Director of Central Intelligence, and the President’s Chief
of Staff, who were all able to implement the policy within their department
once the group had reached a policy decision, and identifying the other two
sub-groups within the NSC as the Deputies Committee—made up of the agency
deputies to the principles, which was the primary policy group and the Policy
Coordinating Committee, consisting of assistant secretaries in the departments—which primarily identified and suggested policy issues for the NSC to
take into consideration).
99 Id. at 63, 72-74.
100 See id. at 76.
101 Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812, Establishing the Office of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council (George W. Bush, Oct.
8, 2001) (amended E.O. 12656; later amended by E.O. 13284 and E.O. 13286);
Brown, supra note 76, at 75-77.
102 See Brown, supra note 76, at 77 (noting the difference in responsibilities to
the PCCs between the NSC and the Presidentially created HSC).
103 6 U.S.C. §§ 491, 494 (2006) (creating, statutorily, the HSC and defining its
functions in assisting the President).
104 50 U.S.C. §402(b).
105 See 104 Cong. Rec. S10625 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statements of Sens.
Specter, R-PA and Kerrey, D-NE) (referring to recent terrorist attack on Khobar
Towers and the Aldrich Ames spy incident, among other examples to support
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the need for flexible thinking and progressive national security programs to
meet the ever changing challenges of the future).
106 See Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-293, §
803, 110 Stat. 3461 (1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402).
107 See 50 U.S.C. § 402(i) (amending the NSA in 1996 in response to newly
perceived and developing threats); Brown, supra note 76, at 27-29.
108 See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (contained in the Intelligence Authorization Act for
FY 1997) (adding a Committee on Foreign Intelligence, making changes to the
annual intelligence reports, and fourteen other substantive additions or changes
to the National Security statute).
109 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 26,
2008), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb08/tradebom_022608.html (noting the first
bombing attack on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993); History and
Mission, Okla. City Nat’l Mem’l & Museum, http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1 (discussing the bombing of the
Oklahoma City Federal Building on April 19, 1995) (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
110 50 U.S.C. §402(i)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
111 §402(i)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
112 §402(i)(3) (emphasis added).
113 §402(i)(4) (emphasis added).
114 §402(i)(2).
115 See generally Brown, supra note 76 (providing a history of the NSC).
116 See 142 Cong. Rec. H11054 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Goss) (adopting the Conference Report and enacting Intelligence Authorization
Act for FY 1997, including the Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996).
117 142 Cong. Rec. H5389 (daily ed. May 22, 1996) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (acknowledging “world economies” as a component of global intelligence
necessary for policy makers, in addition to the traditional weapons of mass
destruction, terrorists, and narcotics).
118 142 Cong. Rec. H11054 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dicks)
(calling for a security strategy adapted to 21st century threats).
119 104 Cong. Rec. S10625 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry)
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